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Denis Vlahovic, University of St. Thomas
Paper presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the Pacific Division o f the
American Philosophical Association, 2005
Plato sometimes says that we come to know Forms by perception. At Rep. 402b, for
example, Socrates says that “we must be able to perceive [aisthanômetha\ (the Forms of the
virtues) and their likenesses.” At Rep. 510e, he talks about “seeing those realities which can be
seen only by the mind” [ekeina idein ha ouk an allôs idoi ê têi dianoiai]. Passages such as these
have led many interpreters to take epistêmê in Plato to involve a direct intuition of Forms.
In recent decades, this interpretation of Plato’s views on epistêmê has been called into
question, most prominently by Gail Fine. In place of this interpretation, which Fine calls the
“objects analysis”1of Plato, she proposes a “contents analysis”, according to which “knowledge
and belief are not set over different objects but only over different contents.. .knowledge is set
over true propositions; belief is set over true and false propositions.” 2
On Fine’s interpretation, A knows thatp when A believes thatp and A can produce an
account, expressing some further set of propositions, which explains why p is true. However,
stating an account of some p is not sufficient for knowingp —I must also know the account. The
latter requirement threatens a regress.3456According to Fine, Plato endorses a coherentist solution to
the problem of stopping the regress: “.. .the regress is finite but has no end. I explain p in terms of
q, and q in terms of r, and so on until, eventually, I appeal again to p\ but if the circle is
sufficiently large and explanatory, then it is virtuous, not vicious.
Fine does not deny that the ultimate objects of knowledge are the Forms. Rather, she
denies that we arrive at such knowledge by directly intuiting the Forms. She believes, instead,
that we arrive at knowledge about the Forms by coming to know propositions about the Forms,
and we derive this propositional knowledge from other items of propositional knowledge. On
Fine’s interpretation, Plato must be speaking metaphorically in the passages-in which he says that
we are capable of a “perception” [aisthêsis] or “seeing” [idem] of Forms.
Fine has come under criticism for her interpretation of the argument of Book V of the
Republic, which is central to her interpretation of Plato’s theory of knowledge.5 However, it
cannot be denied that Plato does say in a number of places that epistêmê consists of knowledge of
an “account” [logos]!3We see this in the Meno, in the context of Socrates’ discussion of the
difference between knowledge and correct opinion [orthê doxa]. Correct opinion is the state in
which one believes what is true without having wisdom regarding this truth [oiomenos men
alêthê, phronôn de me] (97b6-7). Knowledge, on the other hand, includes both correct opinion
and “an account of the cause” [aidas logismoi] (98a3-4).
We have, therefore, evidence supporting two interpretations of epistêmê in Plato, both of
which have some basis in Plato’s texts. On one interpretation, epistêmê is a direct and nonpropositional intuition of the Forms. On the other interpretation, epistêmê is knowledge of an
account. It is the aim of this paper to suggest a way of reconciling these two aspects of Plato’s
theory.
We will not be examining two other controversial questions regarding Plato’s theory of
knowledge. First of all, there is the question whether Plato has anything like the contemporary
1Fine 1978 and 1999.
2 Fine 1999, p. 221.
3 Ibid, p. 238.
4 Ibid, p. 240.
5 F.J. Gonzalez, ‘Propositions or objects?’
6 Of course, one might deny the claim that knowledge of an account is propositional knowledge. I shall
argue shortly that there is a basic sense in which this claim is right.
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notion of a proposition. Some authors have argued that the answer to this question is “no”.7
However, when Fine says that epistêmê in Plato is knowledge of propositions rather than an
intuition of Forms, what she means is that the content of knowledge is exhaustively expressed by
sentences. On the direct intuition interpretation, in contrast, one knows when one has a direct
non-discursive intuition of the object of knowledge.8 Fine’s interpretation, therefore, does not
require anything like a robust contemporary account of the proposition. For, if Plato believes that
a logos expresses exhaustively the content of what is known by someone who has epistêmê, then
Fine’s interpretation of Plato is correct.
A second question is that of what Plato means by a “logos” in the context of his
discussion of epistêmê. The controversy regarding the Theaetetus is typical here.9 At 201Dff.,
Socrates considers the definition of knowledge as “true belief accompanied by an account
[logos].” There is disagreement as to what the knowledge here is knowledge of. Bumyeat takes
the definition of knowledge here to be the following: “Knowing o is having true judgment
concerning o with an account of o, where o is any object, concrete or abstract.”1012Others have
taken knowledge here to be knowledge of a proposition. But, here too, there is disagreement as to
what the nature of the logos is. On one interpretation, it is any logos explaining why it is the case
that p .n On another interpretation, the logos must be an adequate justification for the judgment
that p .n
Neither of these controversies is directly relevant to the discussion here, because our
concern is the question of whether knowledge consists in knowledge of an “account” in a very
general sense of the latter word. In this general sense, an “account” is something the content of
which can be expressed by sentences. In this general sense, the claim that epistêmê is knowledge
of an “account” means that what is known by the person with epistêmê is the content that can be
expressed by some set of sentences.13
We shall henceforth call the latter interpretation of Plato’s views on epistêmê the “Linterpretation” or “L-account” (the “L” in both cases stands for “logos”) of Plato’s theory of
epistêmê. On the alternative interpretation, that which is known is not the content of some set of
sentences. Rather, knowledge requires direct non-discursive intuition of a Form. One can produce
sentences about the Form that are based on this direct intuition, but the direct intuition is
something apart from the content of the sentences produced. We shall call this second
interpretation the “IF-interpretation” or “IF account” (where “IF” stands for “intuition of Forms”)
of Plato’s theory of epistêmê. The question, then, is whether Plato endorses the L-account or the
IF-account, or some third account.

7 Hintikka denies that we can find a robust conception of a proposition in any Greek philosopher (‘Time,
truth’).
8 Lloyd discusses non-discursive thought in Greek philosophy and some problems associated with the claim
that such thought is possible (‘Non-discursive’).
9 Bumyeat gives an overview of the controversy (‘Introduction,’ pp. 130-2).
10 ‘Introduction,’ p. 130. Bumyeat agrees with White {Plato on knowledge, pp. 176-88) here. It is important
to note that, on this interpretation, knowledge is not necessarily a non-discursive intuition of an object.
Thus, as Bumyeat notes, on this interpretation “ we may still hope to find place in the discussion for
explanation, justification, and the knowledge of propositions. We may want to say, for example, that
knowing an object involves knowing propositions about it or having a certain kind of explanation of it
(‘Introduction,’ p i32).”
11 This interpretation is favored by Annas (‘Knowledge’) and Nehamas (‘Epistêmê’).
12This interpretation is favored by Fine (‘Knowledge and logos,' pp. 366-67).
13 It for this reason that the contemporary notion of a proposition is appropriate in discussing knowledge of
an “account.” For, a proposition is something that is expressed by a sentence in a language. The sentences
“Felix is a soldier” and “Felix est un soldat,” for example, express the same proposition in different
languages, and they express fully the content of the corresponding proposition.
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We examined above passages which support each of the IF and L-interpretations of Plato.
Plato is quite consistent in appearing to be of two minds on the subject. The Theaetetus is typical
in this respect. In this dialogue, the definition of knowledge as “true judgment with an account” is
considered and then criticized. But in this same dialogue he also defines thought as a kind of
logos (Theaet. 189e-190a). Thinking [ίο dianoeisthai] is “the logos which the soul has with itself
about any object which it examines.” The soul, when it thinks, “is merely conversing with itself,
asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying.” The latter claim is troubling if one
advocates an IF-interpretation of Plato. For, if all thought is a kind of logos, no non-propositional
intuition is a mode of thought. What, then, is epistêmê if it is not a mode of thought? How is nondiscursive thought possible if all thought is discursive? Before we attempt an answer to this
question we shall examine more closely some passages in which Plato discusses the role of
knowledge of logoi in epistêmê.
Plato thinks that knowing a logos is necessary for epistêmê.MBut, we shall see next that
Plato talks about knowledge of a logos in a way that suggests that he thinks that such knowledge
is not sufficient for epistêmê.
In the Republic Socrates tells his interlocutors that a correct belief [orthê doxa] can be
“stolen by argument (413b).” We see what it means for correct belief to be “stolen” by argument
when Socrates discusses the education of philosophers later in the Republic. An important
component of this education is dialectical inquiry into basic moral and political questions such as
“What is justice?”, “What is the good?” etc. This is a particularly dangerous stage of education
because of the refutability of the doxai to which the student is committed. This is why no one but
potential philosophers ought to be allowed to undertake dialectical inquiry into moral and
political issues.1415 It is also why dialectical inquiry should be introduced even to such individuals
at a very mature age. Those permitted to take part in such discussions must have orderly and
stable natures, in contrast with the current practice of admitting to it any chance and unsuitable
applicant (539d).
The reason why this sort of discussion must be controlled has to do with the ease with
which one can refute the teachings [dogmata] from childhood about the just and the honourable
in which citizens raised as children under the guidance of their parents (538c). Socrates tells us
that, when a young person is met by the question “what is honourable?” and gives the answer
which he learned from “the lawgiver,” the “account is refuted [exelenchthe ho logos]” and “after
many such refutations he is led to believe that this thing [i.e. that which is said by the lawgiver to
be honourable] is no more honourable than it is base.” When, furthermore, he has had the same
experience with teachings about “the just and the good” he will cease to honour and obey these
(538d-e).
It is important to note that “correct opinion” here means something that is already an
explanatory account. Socrates includes explanatory logoi among the correct opinions that he
wants the best state to impart to its citizens through the stories they hear as children.16 This

14 As Bumyeat notes, “despite the Meno it is not clear that Plato himself ever proposed to define knowledge
as true judgment with an account Nowhere outside the Thetetus does he even formulate an explicit
definition of knowledge (‘Introduction,’ 236-37).” It is only at Meno 97c-98a and Symposium 202a that
Plato appears to define knowledge as true judgment with an account. But “neither passage makes it clear
that a definition is intended, and neither need be read as presenting one (ibid., 237n.23).”
,5That is, Plato says that no one but such people ought to be allowed to pursue the highest course of study
which involves a dialectical inquiry into questions such as ‘What is justice?’ and other basic moral and
political issues.
16 For example, he mentions the following explanation, which ought to be imparted to citizens: “One ought
not to be overcome by loss of property or a son or a brother because the good man is most self-sufficient
with respect to what is needed for the good life (387d-e).” It is because such explanatory accounts are
needed that Socrates says that the stories that will impart correct opinion to citizens about the nature of
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caution about discussing correct opinions because of their refutability is also expressed by Plato
in the Laws. In the Laws the lawcode of the state will include explanations of the laws that
citizens must learn.1718Yet, in the Laws the Athenian Stranger recommends the same sorts of
restrictions on the discussion of the nomima that Socrates does in the Republic. For example, the
Stranger thinks that it is important to control discussion of the law, especially among the young
(634d-e).
We find additional evidence of Plato’s diffidence concerning logoi in the Phaedrus,
where Socrates distinguishes philosophers and “writers of logöi".18 Someone who has nothing to
show of more value than the logoi on whose phrases he spends hours is merely a “writer of logoi”
(278d-e). Someone who produces a logos is not a mere writer of logoi but a “philosopher” if such
a person: (a) has written the text “knowing the truth” [eidôs to alêthes]\ and (b) can defend his
logos against attempts at refutation [echón boêthein, eis elenchon iôn]. In defending his logos
against refutation, such an author demonstrates the inferiority of his writings out of his own
mouth (278c-d). The elaborateness and detail of a logos, therefore, are not evidence that the logos
is the product of epistêmê. Rather, someone displays the knowledge characteristic of a
philosopher if she can defend her elaborate logoi against attempts at refutation.
Sometimes Socrates objects to the kind of logos given by an interlocutor. He usually does
so because he thinks that only those who are able to produce a certain kind of logos (an
explanatory logos, say) can be said to have epistêmê. In the Phaedrus passage we have just
examined, on the other hand, the requirement is not that one be able to produce a certain kind of
logos, but that one be able to defend a certain kind of logos against refutation. Only someone able
to do this can claim to have produced the logos “knowing of the truth” [eidôs to alêthes].
In the Republic the practice of dialectic is an important aspect of the acquisition of
philosophical knowledge. A “dialectician” is a person who is able to produce an account of the
essence of each thing [ton logon hekastou... tés ousias] (534b9-10). Someone who wants to be a
philosopher must be able to define the Form of the Good by means of a logos, distinguishing it
from all other Forms [diorisasthai toi logôi apo ton allônpantôn aphelôn tên tou agathou idean].
But in the Republic too producing a certain kind of logos is not enough. One must be able to
defend the logos “as if in battle, testing out by all refutations” [hôsper en machêi diapantôn
elenchôn diexiôn}, and striving to refute this logos “by reality and not by opinion” [mê kata doxan
alia kat'ousian prothoumenos elenchein]. One must pass through all of this with one’s account
intact [enpasi toutois aptôti tôi logôi diaporeuêtai] (534bl3-cl7).19The person who lacks this
power does not really know the good itself or any particular good. And if he apprehends any
shadow [eidôlou] of it, his contact with it is by opinion and not by knowledge (534c).
human beings can be determined “only when we’ve discovered what sort of thing justice is and how by
nature it profits one who has it (392c).”
17 For example, he says that “The laws themselves will explain the duties we owe to children, relatives,
friends, and fellow citizens (718a).” He says that explaining the laws will “help to make people more
amenable and better disposed to listen to what the lawgiver recommends (718d).” He recommends
explanatory “preambles” to the laws, of which the preamble to the marriage law at 721 bff. is an example.
18 At 278e he says that such a person is a “writer of logo?' [logon sungraphea]. “Logographos" -meaning
“writer of logoP—is used at 257c and 258b.
19 Adam warns, in his commentary on the Republic, concerning “dia pantôn elenchôn diexiôn” [“as it were
in battle”], that, “though the ordinary interpretation supposes that the elenchoi are applied by others, this
would require that we take elenchein as = elenchein tous ton allôn elenchous, which is difficult (Republic
v.2, p.142).” According to Adam Plato means here that “we apply the elenchoi ourselves.” At “we kata
doxan alia kat’ousian prothoumenos elenchein” Plato means, according to Adam, that “the dialectician
tests his view of the good not by... what ‘seems’ (good, bad, etc.) to the many, but by the Truth i.e. by that
which ‘is’ in the Platonic sense of ousia. viz. the Ideas, such as (let us say) the Ideas of kallos. dikaion. and
so forth. The Idea of the Good has connexions and relations with all the other Ideas... and our knowledge of
these may therefore be used to test the accuracy of our conception of the Good (v.2, pp. 142-3).”
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It seems, therefore, that epistêmê cannot just be a matter of knowing a logos. Knowledge,
it appears, is demonstrated not in the knowledge of any particular logos, but in the ability to
defend a logos against refutation. It is precisely the latter ability that is characteristic of epistêmê.
This ability, furthermore, cannot be imparted by means of a logos. For, no logos suffices to
endow its possessor with the ability to defend it (i.e., the logos) against refutation.
Given that Plato appears to have believed that no knowledge of a logos—no matter how
elaborate the logos—is sufficient for epistêmê, one can see why he was drawn to describing
epistêmê as requiring a direct intuition of Forms. One can also see why he was inclined, in
describing such direct intuition, to use the language of visual perception. When I see an object, I
can describe the object—or answer questions about it posed to me by someone who does not see
the object—but no logos that I can give exhausts the content of what I see. It is true that some
contemporary philosophers would take issue with the claim that the content of visual perception
is non-propositional. However, it is not implausible to suppose that Plato thought of the content
of visual perception in this way.
As we saw above, Plato says, in the Theaetetus, that all thought [dianoia] is a logos. He
expresses the same view in the Sophist, at 263ff. There we are tóld that “thought and speech are
the same” [dianoia...kai logos autori]. Thought is the soul’s conversation with itself, its
distinguishing feature being that it is “conversation without sound” [diálogos aneuphonês].
:Why does Plato think that dianoia is a kind of logos? He gives one reason at Sophist
263e. According to the Eleatic Stranger, “we know that in speech there is just affirmation and
denial” [en logois... isomen...enonphasin kai apophasin], which is also what occurs in thought.
The difference is that, when these acts occur in thought, they occur silently.20
At Theaetetus 189e-190a we are given another reason for thinking that dianoia is a kind
of logos. When the soul thinks, it converses [dialegesthai] with itself, “asking itself questions and
answering, affirming and denying [erôtôsa kai apokrinomenê, kaiphaskousa kai ouphaskousa].”
This process ends when it has arrived at a decision [hotan horisasa], whether “slowly or with a
sudden leap,” and finally “agrees with itself and is no longer in doubt” [to auto êdê phêi kai mê
distazê]. This final determination of thought is called “opinion” [<doxa]. Herè the reason for
describing thought as a kind of speech is that the process of arriving at a new item of opinion—an
affirmation or denial which one had not previously made with confidence—is discursive.
Dianoia is not the only way in which we arrive at affirmation and negation, according to
Plato. Affirmation and negation, when it occurs in the soul silently “by way of thought” [kata
dianoian] is opinion [doxa]. But affirmation and negation can also arise in the soul “through
sensation” [di aisthêseôs] (Soph. 264a). In such cases affirmation and denial are called “fancy”
[phantasia] rather than opinion.21
Plato’s discussion of dianoia is often cited in contemporary discussions of the
relationship between thought and language.22 Burnyeat notes, regarding the discussion of dianoia
in these passages that “this is very much an intellectual’s picture of thinking. That is to say, it is a
picture of intellectual thinking rather than, for example, of the thought and concentration with
which an athlete runs, an artist paints, or a child reads” (‘Introduction,’ p. 84). It may be,
however, that Plato is discussing one kind of thought in this passage—the kind that involves

20 What we call “opinion” [doxa] is affirmation and denial arising in the soul “silently” and “by way of
thought” (264a).
21 We are also told that, when affirmation or denial are caused by sensation, they do not originate in the
soul “with respect to itself’ [kath'hauto] (264a). Presumably, this is because they originate in something
external to the soul, namely the objects of sensation.
22 One recent author, for example, tells us that, in these passages, Plato establishes that “there is a logical or
‘internal’ connection between thought and language: thought just is the discourse of the mind with itself
“(Preston, Thought, p. 1).
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affirmation and denial, and results in new items opinion and knowledge [doxa, epistêmê]—and
that he would recognize other kinds of thought.23
We can now address again the question of the role of logoi in epistêmê. Given his belief
that thought is a kind of speech, it seems plausible to suppose that, for Plato, whenever I arrive at
a true judgment, I do so by seeing that it follows from other affirmations and denials that I have
made. In the Meno, for example, the slave-boy is led by Socrates to a true judgment about how
one can, for any square, construct another square twice the size. Socrates gets the slave-boy to see
that, given other affirmations and denials that he has made, he should also affirm the solution
proposed by Socrates. In the Meno, the slave-boy example is held up as a model for Socrates’
theory of the way in which we arrive at new items of knowledge. In the Theaetetus and Sophist
Plato is telling us that all thought proceeds in this way. The difference, presumably, between, on
the one hand, thought that leads us to items of knowledge, and, on the other thought that leads us
to items of incorrect opinion, is that one arrives at the former by good reasoning and at the latter
by bad reasoning. The sequence of thought from which a correct opinion follows is—assuming
that the sequence of thought is of the right sort—a logos explaining that correct opinion.24
But if this is how all thought proceeds, what of the direct intuition of Forms? And did we
not also see evidence that Plato believes that no logos is a sufficient basis for knowledge? In
attempting to answer these questions, it is important to note Plato’s description of the way in
which the intuition of Forms and the production of logoi work together. An example is Laws
965b. Using the typical visual language, the Athenian Stranger tells us that the master craftsman
in any discipline must be able not only to look at the many but also to direct his gaze to the one
\mê monon dein pros ta polla blepein dunaton einai, pros de to hen epeigesthai gnônai te] (965b).
Indeed, the Stranger tells us, in any subject, one must be able to look from the many and
dissimilar objects to the one Form [pros mian idean ek ton pollón kai anomoiôn dunaton einai
blepein] (965 c).
Having resolved, with Clinias, to apply this same method to their inquiry into virtue, the
Stranger says something quite revealing about the way in which this method will be implemented.
He and Clinias want to know what virtue is. In order to do this they must discover that which is
one in courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom. They must proceed, the Athenian Stranger tells
Clinias, until they are able to “say what the essential nature is of the object at which [they] are
looking” [prin an hikanôs eipômen ti pot ’ esting eis ho blepteori] (965d). They cannot suppose
that they know the nature of virtue if they are unable to “say whether it is many or four or one”
[eipolla est ' out’ ei tettara outh hôs hen dunatoiphrazein] (965e). We see here that coming to
have knowledge of some Form consists of a process of producing a logos by inspecting a Form—
the inspection of the Form being described here in typically visual terms.
The intuition of Forms and the production of logoi seem to contribute together to the
acquisition of epistêmê: the production of a logos contributes to the acquisition of epistêmê only
if it is accompanied by an intuition of a Form; and a Form is intuited in a way that contributes to
the acquisition of epistêmê only if it results in the production of logoi that are about the Form.
But what of the idea that all dianoia is discursive? I suggest that Plato means by
“dianoia” thought that is conscious, and that the intuition of Form is a non-conscious mode of

23 Bumyeat says further that, even as a description of philosophical thinking “it omits much that is
important. Most conspicuously, it omits all mention of reasoning (p. 84).” Again, this seems not to be on
target given that thought is described here in a way that fits quite well with the discussion, in the Republic,
of dialectical inquiry as the basis of philosophical knowledge.
24 Here we can offer an explanation here of what Socrates means in the Meno when he says that the slaveboy example has established that epistêmê is correct opinion together with “an account of the cause” [aitias
logismôi] (98a3-4). The sequence of affirmations and denials from which the correct solution to the
problem follows is the “account of the cause” of the true opinion in the sense that it is an account of the
reason why the true opinion is true.
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thought. John Haldane’s discussion of non-conscious thought is relevant here. According to
Haldane, “...some thoughts occur in the absence of any phenomenal accompaniment or
correlate...these can only be reported propositionally... (‘thinking,’ p. 130).” Plato, I am
suggesting, would have described the intuition of Forms in the same way.
Perhaps the process of intuiting Forms enters into conscious thought as a feeling of
certitude that some argument establishes the truth of a proposition. One might, in intuiting a
Form, experience a sense of certainty about a propositional item of knowledge. One might sense
the connections between propositions. But, beyond this, there is no conscious thought that has the
Forms as its objects.
The intuition of Forms would not, then, be the sort of experience that one can describe in
ways that go further than the logoi that are the accompaniment of such an experience. One
cannot, for example, say “Ah, o.k., now I see the Form of the number two, let me tell you what is
it like,” and proceed to check what one is saying against the image of the Form. For, there is
nothing to our conscious experience of the Forms beyond the discursive thought in which we
typically engage.
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